Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game

Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of a suggested finite game includes a family of nested simultaneous non-cooperative finite games with intra- and inter-coalition externalities. In this family, games differ by the size of maximum coalition, partitions and by coalition structure formation rules. A result of every game consists of partition of players into coalitions and a payoff? profiles for every player. Every game in the family has an equilibrium in mixed strategies with possibly more than one coalition. The results of the game differ from those conventionally discussed in cooperative game theory, e.g. the Shapley value, strong Nash, coalition-proof equilibrium, core, kernel, nucleolus. We discuss the following applications of the new game: cooperation as an allocation in one coalition, Bayesian games, stochastic games and construction of a non-cooperative criterion of coalition structure stability for studying focal points.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1612.02344, arXiv:1612.0374

Endogenous Demand for Money and Default of a Creditor

We study a general equilibrium model of perfect competition with production and endogenous demand for fiat (or non-consumable) money (Shubik-Wilson, 1977), with workers, entrepreneurs, and a bank. Workers supply labor (Beker, 1971) and consume, entrepreneurs consume and organize production. There is no barter, and both agent types borrow money from a bank. The bank motivates borrowers to pay loans back with a punishment, which has an impact on demands for credits before a trade. The model has three markets: labor, goods, and credits. We study the results of the credit market with a numerical simulation in Maple. The model has 4 regimes, one of which corresponds to the classical money theory. Three other regimes have defaults as parts of an equilibrium.  The special feature of our model is that   it allows to study interactions of real (production and demand/supply of labor) markets with a nominal (credit) market, but also it can produce cases, when a value of default of borrowers exceeds total money supply from the bank, what become a reason for insolvency of the bank